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SITUATIOX

II.

vVar exists bet,veen States X andY. 1~he United States
is neutral. A port of State X is placed under martialla,v.
l\1r. B, a citizen of the United States, residing and doing
business at the port, is seized, in1prisoned, and about to
be deported w·i thou t trial. He appeals to the-commander
of a United States "~ar vessel "-ho chances to be the only
representative of the United .States in the region.
What action, if any, is the commander justified in
taking~
SOLl.JTIOX.

The com1nander of the United States "-ar vessel 'vould
be justified in requesting that ~fr. B be not arbitrarily
deported 'vithout trial, that he have a prompt and fair
trial by a military court or commission, and if the military
exigencies make a trial impracticable) he 'vould be justified in requesting that l\Ir. B be placed in his custody.
XOTES ON SITUATION II.

Nature of 1nartiallaw.-Silent leges inter arrna is a common dictum of municipalla,v. This has been repeatedly
recognized by the Government of the United States.
The ordinary courts refuse to interfere 'vith the course
of military judg1nent as enforced by courts-martial. .A.s
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dynes v.
Hoover (20 Ho,v., 65), "\\Tith the sentences of courtsmartial 'vhich have been convened regularly, and have
proceeded legally, and by w·hich punishments are directed
'vhich are not forbidden by }a,v, or w·hich are according
to the la,vs and customs of the sea, civil courts have nothing to do, nor are they in any 'vay alterable by them."
As Halleck says:
It is necessary to distinguish between military and martiallaw; for the two
are very different. In Great Britain the former has only to do with the land
forces mentioned in section 2 of the ~futiny Act-now the Army Art, 1881and the Articles of 'Yar. In the United States the Rules and Articles of
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War constitute the l\lilitary law. This law exists equally in peace and in war,
and is as fixed and definite in its provisions as the Admiralty, Ecclesiastical,
or any other branch of law, and is equally with them a part of the general
law of the land. But :Martial law originates either in the prerogative of the
Crown, as in Great Britain, or from the exigency of the occasion, as in other
States; it is one of the rights of sovereignty, and is as essential to the
existence of a State as is the right to declare or carry on w·ar. It is a power
inherent in every Government, and must be regarded and recognized by all
Dther Governments. It is one of the incidents of war, invasion, or rebellion;
and arises when there is no time for the slow and cumbrous proceedings of
the Civil law. Like the power to take human life in battle, it results directly
and immediately from the fact that war in name or in substance exists.
(Halleck's International Law, Baker's ed., vol. 1, p. 544.)

Application toM r. B.-lVfr. B, in the case under consideration, is a citizen of the United States residing and doing
business in the port of State X. This port is under martial
la\v. He is not exempt by virtue of his United States
citizenship from any of the legitimate consequences of
\var. The Instructions for the Government of . .t\.rmies of
the United States in the Field provide (Section 1, 7) that
~'martial la\v extends to property, and to persons,
\vhether they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that
Government." These Instructions, which have been
generally approved as liberal by other States of the \Vorld,
also provide (Section 1, 5) that ''martial la\v should be
less stringent in places and countries fully occupied and
fairly conquered. 1vfuch greater severity may be exer-.
cised in places or regions \vhere actual hostilities exist,
or are expected and must be prepared for. Its most complete S\vay is allo,ved, even in the commander's O\Vn
country, \vhen face to face \Vith the enemy, because of the
absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount
duty to defend the country against invasion."
These rules of \var indicate the propriety of the suspension of the ordinary legal processes during the actual
hostilities. This position has also been sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
. •
"If in foreign invasion or civil \Var, the courts are actually closed, and it is jmpossible to administer criminal
justice according to la,v, then, on the theater of active
military operations, \Yhere \var really prevails, there is
necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority,
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thus oYerthro\\·n, to preserYc the safety of the a: n1y and
of society; and as no po,\·er is left but the 1nilitary, it is
allo,\·ed to goY ern by n1artial rule until the la \\·s can haYe
their free course. As necessity ereates the rule, so it
li1nits its duration; for, if this GoYerninent is continued
after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of
po,\·er. :\Iartial rule can neYer exist \\·here the courts are
open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual
\\'"ar.'·' (Ex Parte JI illigan 4, "\"Vallace 2. ~Ir. Justice
DaYis deliYered the opinion.)
The fact that ~Ir. B, the citizen of t:he United States,
\Vas do!ng business in State X gaYe to hin1 a more conlplete connection and interest in the affairs and destiny
of State X than \\·otdd the siln pie fact of te1n porary
SOJOUrn.

Risley (La\\'" of "\"Var, p. 93) says:
'\Vhere a person of whateYer n~tionality~ or his property, or a tract of
territory, beco!lles connected with the enemy State in such a manner as to
be a source, directly or indirectly, of strength and assistance to that State,
such person, property, or territory must be regarded as being subject to or
belonging to the enemy, and acquires an enemy character.
Enemy character as attaching to persons and their property may arise
from permanent allegiance to and residence within the territory of the
adYerse belligerent, in which case it is complete: or it may be of a partial
and temporary nature, limited to certain intents and purposes, arising from
such particular circumstances as haYing possessions in enemy territory, or
maintaining n house of commerce there, from personal residence there,
or from pnrticular modes of traffic, such as sailing under the enemy's flag
or passport.
By this manner a belligerent's own subject or a neutral subject may
acquire an enemy character depending upon a kind of implied temporary
allegiance to the enemy State: but as soon as he chooses to terminate his
hostile allegiance he terminates his hostile character.

As \\·ell stated by Davis (Elen1en ts of In tern a tional
La\\·, p. 333)JI artiallaw, or to speak more correctly military rule, or the law of hostile
OCCUpation, is a term applied to the goYernment of an OCCUpied territory by
the commanding general of the in,·ading force. ~Iartial law also pre,·ails
in the immediate theater of operations of an army in the field. The
reason in both cases is the same. The ordinary agencies of goYernment,
including the machinery proYided for the preYention and punishment of
crime, are suspended by the fact of war. This suspension takes place at a
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time when society is Yiolently disturbed, when the usual restraints of law
are at a minimum of efficiency, and when the need of such restraint is the
greatest possible. This state of affairs is the direct result of the invasion, or
occupation, of the disturbed territory by an enemy. The only organized
power capable of restoring and maintaining order is that of the invading
force, which is Yested in its commanding general.
Upon him, therefore, inteniational law places the responsibility of preserving order, punishing criine, and protecting life and property within the
limits of his command. His pmver in the premises is equal to his responsibility. In cases of extreme urgency, such as arise after a great battle, or the
capture of a besieged place or a defended town, he may suspend all law and
may punish crimes summarily, or by tribunals of his own constitution. . ..
He appeal'S in the occupied territory as an agent of his government, charged
with the conduct of certain military operations. His first responsibility is
to his own government for the successful conduct of the military operations
with the direction of which he is charged. In carrying on those operations
his government and himself are bound by the la,vs of war. The usages of
war authorize him to employ certain ·forcible measures toward his enemy.
They forbid indiscriminate violence, the use·of excessive force, or the use of
any force which does not contribute directly to the end for which the war is
undertaken. His exercise of authority in the occupied territory must,
therefore, be the least possible, consistent with these ends.

Position of Department of State.-During the revolution
in Ha,vaii, in 1895, the follo,ving telegram was sent by
Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, to ~1r. Willis:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE'

lVashington, February ~5, 1895.
\Vith reference to your telegram of the 17th instant, touching the imprisonment or condemnation of numerous persons in connection 'vith the recent
disturbance in Hawaii, I observe your statement that 13 American citizens
are still in prison without charges and without trinl. This Gm·ernment has
no disposition to be exacting with that of Hawaii, especially under present
circumstances, but it owes a duty to its citizens to see to it that they are not
wantonly subje~ted to arbitrary treatment. Though martial law has been
proclaimed, it does not follow that aliens innocent of participation in the
acts which gave rise to its proclamation may be arrested and indefinitely
imprisoned without charges and without trial. The existence of martial
law, while it may imply the suspension of the methods and guaranties by
which justice js ordinarily secured, does not imply a suspension of justice
itself. You are instructed to insist to the Hawaiian Government that the
American citizens still imprisoned without charge and without trial shall be
promptly tried or promptly released.
G.RESHAl\I.

The letter of Nlr. Greshan1 to ~{r. vYillis of the san1c date
'vith the above telegram, also defines the position of the
United States in a special instance. It may be stated in
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advance that the ~Ir. J. Crnnstoun mentioned belo\v "~as
subsequently sho\\~n not to be an .:\..merican citizen. The
letter is us follo\\~s:
No. 66.1

DEPARTIIEXT OF STATE,

lVashington, February 25, 1895.
I haYe to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 86 of the 8th instant,
in relation to afl'nirs in Hawaii, and particularly in relation to the forcible
deportation on the 2d instant of three men, one of whom, :.Ir. J. Cranstoun,
claims to be a citizen of the United States.
I inclose herewith copies of certain depositions made by :.rr. Cranstoun
on the 11th and 12th instant, before :Jir. Peterson, the commercial agent of
the United States at Vancou,~er. These depositions leave the question of
.1Ir. Cranstoun's nationality in doubt, and .1Ir. Peterson has been instructed
to obtain further statements from him on that subject.
Under these circumstances, the Department does not now instruct you
to make any representations to the Hawaiian Government in regard to :Mr.
Cranstoun, but it is proper to express to you, for your own guidance in
similar cases, should they arise, the views here entertained in regard to the
course of action taken in that case.
It appears that after having been kept in jail for nearly a month, without
any charges having been made against hrm, he was taken under a heavy
guard to a steamer and would, in spite of his request to you, have been
deported ,,·ithout having had an opportunity then to do so had it not been
for the accidental but timely interposition of the British commissioner.
You state that when you asked the attorney-general for an explanation
of the proceeding he rf'plied that the cabinet had determined to deport the
men "in the exercise of the arbitrary power conferred by martial law."
As this was the only explanation he gave, it is pnsumed it \Yas all he had
to offer, and he gave it without suggestion of any question as to :Jir. Cranstoun's nationality.
If the position thus assumed be sound, the very proclamation of martial
law in Hawaii renders all foreigners there residing, including Alnericans,
liable to arrest and deportation without cause and without any reason other
than the fact that the executiYe power wills it. They may be taken from
their homes and their business; they may bf' deprived of their liberty and
banished; they may be denied the ordinary as well as the special treaty
rights of residence without offense or misconduct on their part, simply in
the exercise of "arbitrary power."
To state such a proposition is, in the opinion of the President, to refute it.
"Truly viewed," says an eminent author, "martial law can only change the
administration of the laws, give them a rapid force, and make their penalties CPrtain and effectual-not abrogat3 what was the justice of the community before The civil courts arc in part, or fully suspended, but, in
reason, the new summary tribttnals should govern themselYcs in their proceedings, as far as circumstances admit, by established principles of justice
the same which had been recognized in the courts." (Bishop's Criminal
Law, Sf' C. 4.5.)
SIR:
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In view of what has been stated, your course in protesting against the
position assumed by the attorney-general of Ha,vaii is approved.
I am, etc.,
\V . Q. GRESHAM.
(U.S. Foreign Relations, 1895, p. 842.)

Position of the War Department.-A late opinion rendered to the vVar Department of the United States by
Hon. Charles E. :.J,Iagoon, la'v officer, Bureau of Insular
~~flairs (The La'v of Civil Government Under 1Iilitary
Occ'upation, p. 12), says:
It will be seen that a military government takes the place of a suspended
or destroyed sovereignty, while martial law or, more properly, martial rule,
takes the place of certain governmental agencies which for the time being
are unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains subject to the sovereignty.
The occasion of military government is the expulsion of the sovereignty
theretofore existing, which is usually accomplished by a successful military
mvaswn.
The occasion of martial rule is simply public exigency, which may arise
in time of war or peace.
A military government, since it take~ the place of a deposed sovereignty
of necessity continues until a permanent sovereignty is again established
in the territory. :\lartial rule ceases when the district is sufficiently· tranquil
to permit the ordinary agencies of government to cope with existing conditions.
The power of such government, in time of war, is a large and extraordinary one, being subject only to such conditions and. restrictions as the laws
of war impose upon it.
As \vas said by the United States Supreme Court, such governing authority" may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy.
There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such cases save those
which arc found in the laws and usages of war.
. In such cases
the la,vs of war take the place of the Constitution and laws of the Lnited
States as applied in the time of peace." (New Orleans v. Steamship Co.,
20 "Tall., 394.)
Commenting on this view of the law, the Texas supreme court say: "This
language, strong as it may seem, asserts a rule of international law recognized as applicable during a state of war." (Daniel v. Hutcheson, 86
Texas, 61.)
~lartial rule, as exercised in any country by the commander of an invading army, is an elem.ent of jus belli. It is incidental to a state of war and
appertains to the law of nations. The commander of the occupying army
rules the territory within his military jurisdiction as necessity demands and
prudence dictates, restrained by international law and obligations, the
usages and laws of war, and the orders of his superior offic<.'rs of the government he serves and represents.
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Oonclusion.-lt is eYident that the conunander In a
region under n1artial la'v has a right to exercise such a
1neasure of control of all inhabitants of the region,
'vhether natives or foreigners, as 1nilitary operations Inay
require, and only that degree of force should be used
'vhich is necessary to accon1plish the end of the 'var.
Tllis end can not be brought about n1ore speedily by
inflicting undue hardships on the innocent population;
indeed, such action often prolongs hostilities.
In the case of ~Ir. B, the citizen of the United States,
at a port of State X, w·hich port is under Inartial la"~, it
is proper, according to the position of the United States
GoYernn1ent, that the ordinary processes of law· should
be hastened, because the existence of such a state of jurisdiction i1nplies that ordinary court processes are not
sufficiently effectiYe to Ineet iininediate exigencies.
Even though :Jir. B is an alien in State X, the fact that
he has been residing and doing business at the port renders hin1 liable to the consequences of his sojourn in the
tilne of 'var, proYided the conunander declaring Inartial
la'v does not exceed his authority in the action to"·ard
l\Ir. B.
The seizure of ~Ir. B is an act "·hich is w·ithin the field
of proper authority of the con1n1ander enforcing Inartial
la,v. The teinporary in1prisoninent n1ay be and often is
necessary in the tin1e of Inartial la 'v. lin prison1nen t
'vithout trial, ho"·ever, 1nay be only for the period of
absolute Inilitary necessity. l\Iartialla"? does not i1nply
the absence of justice in the treatment of the population
'vhich Inay be under it for the tiine being, but rather the
acceleration of the course of justice. As deportation and
in1prisoninent for a considerable tin1e 'vithout trial 'vould
imply the absence or denial of proper procedure under
generally recognized principles of international la,v, the
com1nander of the United States "·ar vessel "?ould be
justified in hearing the appeal of th~ citizen of the United
States, :Jir. B. He "?ould be further justified in asking
for l\Ir. B a fair trial by a Inilitary court or coininission.
If the n1ilitary exigencies Inake such a trial impracticable, the conunander of the United States 'var vessel
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\vould be justified in requesting that ~1r. B be placed in
his custody, in "Thich case he \Vould be under obligation
to see that ~1r. B conducts himself in a proper 1nanner
\Yith regard to the authorities controlling the port.
Such action \Vould accord 'vith the general principles
of justice and "Tould be according to the instructions of
the Department of State in the cases in Ha,vaii in 1895,
\Yhen the Secretary saidYou are instructed to insist to the Hawaiian Government that the American citizens still imprisoned without charges and without trial shall be
promptly tried or promptly released.

The fundan1ental fact in all cases \Yhere martialla'v is
declared is that it does not establish arbitrary authority
\Vithout regard to la,v· in the commander of the region, but
accelerates the course of justice so far as the military
necessities at the ti1ne demand.

